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The aim of this article is to delineate some of the parameters of Security Council (UNSC) referrals and deferrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC). I contend that the Court itself is limited to a far greater degree in law than the UNSC’s first referral would suggest. Furthermore, while it can be strongly argued that the ICC could act to judicially review referrals and deferrals of the UNSC, I submit that the pragmatic operation of the Court within the international environment would render such a development extremely unwise. Alternatively, attempts by the UNSC to either limit or expand the jurisdiction of the Court beyond that which is provided for by the Rome Statute could, more appropriately, be dealt with in accordance with a interpretative presumption that,

a)	presumes an UNSC intention not to go beyond the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction; and,
b)	requires a liberal interpretation which reflects a willingness to give effect to the intention of the SC within the confines of the Rome Statute.   

I submit that such an approach ought to be preferred over the antagonistic language of judicial review. Under such an approach ambiguous provisions within UNSC resolutions could be more delicately handled by the Prosecutor of the ICC by availing him of a greater opportunity to categorise them as either referrals or deferrals pursuant to Articles 13(b) or 16 of the Rome Statute.  

In examining both UNSC referrals and deferrals under the Rome Statute I will have course to primarily concentrate upon the recent SC referral of the situation within Darfur, Sudan. However, I will also discuss the position of the apparent blanket deferral contained within UNSC resolution 1422. Applying the above presumption I will attempt to show that an acceptable compromise could be reached that would both maintain the jurisdictional integrity of the Court and give effect, at least in part, to the intention of the SC. I submit that both of these outcomes would not be possible if the ICC were to challenge the legality of ambiguous resolutions. 

The Darfur Region of Sudan:

Gross humanitarian atrocities have ravaged the Darfur region of Sudan since February of 2003. The conflict has resulted in the death of between 50,000 and 200,000 individuals and the displacement of 1.65 million.​[2]​ In an effort to quell the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) the Sudanese government has allegedly committed a horrendous list of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Such crimes include, rape, sexual violence, looting, killing and forced displacement.​[3]​ These crimes have been committed upon civilians who merely share the same ethnicity as the SLA and the JEM. As a consequence of these and other attacks by government forces and the Janjaweed,​[4]​ the SLA and JEM have retaliated by kidnapping civilians, terrorising government institutions, stealing livestock and enlisting children as military combatants.​[5]​ 

Despite clear signs of a humanitarian disaster the United Nations (UN) failed in their attempts to facilitate a peaceful settlement. Atrocities continued to occur despite the signing of a ceasefire agreement on 8 April, 2004. The deepening humanitarian crisis led to the Sudanese Government signing a Joint Communiqué with the UN on 3 July, 2004. This was followed by UNSC resolution 1556 which effectively reiterated the conditions of the earlier communiqué.​[6]​ The UNSC resolution called for the Sudanese government to immediately fulfil their previous commitments including; 

a)	enforce a moratorium on all activities that may hinder the access and provision of humanitarian assistance to those affected within the area; 
b)	to establish effective security for the civilian population of the area; and 
c)	to resume talks with the JEM and the SLA. 

Furthermore, the resolution not only called for the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed militias but to also bring to justice those members of the Janjaweed ‘and their associates’ who had facilitated humanitarian and human rights atrocities.​[7]​  It also welcomed ‘the commitment by the Government of Sudan to investigate the atrocities and prosecute those responsible.’​[8]​ To this end, the UNSC called for the UN Secretary-General to report to the Council every 30 days on the progress of the Sudanese government and noted that action under Article 41 of the UNC could be considered if the Sudanese government stayed in material breach of its obligations.​[9]​ This resolution was followed by the signing of an agreement between the Sudanese Government and the UN on 6 August, which acted to pave ‘the way for Khartoum to take detailed steps in the next 30 days to disarm the militias’.​[10]​ Despite increased global awareness of the atrocities committed in Darfur and the efforts of the UN, the humanitarian crisis continues in the region. Human Rights Watch has concluded that the Sudanese Government has not shown a serious commitment to protecting the civilians of Darfur. It states that if the government were serious,​[11]​
 
… it would welcome an increased international presence to help it stop the violence and put in place the conditions necessary for the voluntary and safe return of civilians to their home villages.        

The mandate of the International Commission of Inquiry was established pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSC resolution 1564. The paragraph requested the Secretary-General to,

... rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable. 

Armed with such a mandate the Commission was effectively placed in the position of an international investigator charged with examining all of the circumstances associated with criminal prosecution.​[12]​ This task involved investigating actual events themselves as well as the associated international criminal law. Furthermore, the Commission went so far as identifying possible perpetrators.  

The Commission’s discussion of Genocide is of particular interest. Importantly, the Report observes that the attacks on the civilian population of Darfur, while concentrating upon a number of ‘so-called’ “African” tribes including the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Jebel and Aranga peoples, cannot be described as genocide.​[13]​ In reaching such a conclusion the Commission notes that there is difficultly in establishing the necessary genocidal intent.​[14]​ While not specifically referring to the definition of Genocide under the Rome Statute, the Report does refer to the Genocide Convention of 1948 and Customary International Law, the former of which was heavily relied upon in the definition of Genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute. While set at a fairly general level, the Report’s discussion of Genocide and ‘groups’ in particular are likely to be of interest to the ICC. 

In noting that atrocities continue to be perpetrated on both sides, the Commission ‘strongly’ recommended that the UNSC refer the matter to the ICC as the ‘competent Prosecutor’.​[15]​ In a similar vein the Commission notes that,​[16]​ 

[t]he measures taken so far by the Government to address the crisis have been both grossly inadequate and ineffective, which has contributed to the climate of almost total impunity for human rights violations in Darfur.

It was thus alleged that the Sudanese Government were heavily implicated in the crimes committed in the Darfur region and have done little in the face of international pressure to appease the plight of civilians within that area. The Commission therefore stated that a referral to the ICC as ‘the only truly international institutional of criminal justice, would ensure that justice be done’.​[17]​ 

However, the Commission did discuss alternatives to an ICC referral. The first of these were domestic prosecutions within the Sudanese courts. However, due to the inaction of the Government of Sudan it was determined that ‘the Sudanese courts [were] … unable and unwilling to prosecute’ such alleged offenders.​[18]​ The remaining options were of a quasi international nature. Of these, perhaps the most interesting was the suggestion of the United States for the establishment of an ad hoc criminal tribunal in the nature of the ICTY and ICTR. As Cryer has noted, ‘[t]his was because the US would rather pay for such an institution than grant any legitimacy to the ICC’.​[19]​ However, this suggestion was rejected on the basis of cost and delay.​[20]​  
  

The Security Council’s Darfur Referral:

On the 31st of March 2005 the UNSC made its first formal referral to the ICC under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (UNC). The referral was made despite the fact that three of the Council’s permanent members are not State Parties to the Rome Statute.​[21]​ In deciding ‘to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’​[22]​ the UNSC established a significant precedent in the investigation and punishment of alleged international criminals. It would have been wildly optimistic if, at the conclusion of the Rome Conference in July 1998, one were to have said that the Court would be established before 2003 and have its first UNSC referral before 2005. To say that such a referral was merely unexpected is to fail to appreciate the passion in which the US has objected to the ICC. John Bolton, now US representative to the United Nations, has stated that,​[23]​ 

…the Court and the Prosecutor are illegitimate [and are] a stealth approach to eroding our constitutionalism. 

He went on to state that, 

The United States should raise our objections to the ICC on every appropriate occasion, as part of our larger campaign to assert American interests against stifling, illegitimate and unacceptable international agreements. The plain fact is that additional "fixes" over time to the ICC will not alter its multiple inherent defects, and we should not try to do so. The United States has many alternative foreign policy instruments to utilize that are fully consistent with our national interests, leaving the ICC to the obscurity it so richly deserves. Signatories of the Rome Statute have created an ICC to their liking, and they should live with it. We should not.

Bassiouni has however highlighted that,​[24]​

… the concerns of the United States are overstated and that the interests of the United States in having an ICC far outweigh the marginal and far-fetched concerns that have been articulated by political opponents of the ICC.
 
The US abstention in relation to UNSC resolution 1593 ought not, however, to be seen as a softening of the US approach to the ICC. The US representative to the SC stated by way of addendum to their abstention that,​[25]​ 

Although we abstained on the … Resolution … we have not dropped, and indeed continue to maintain our long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the ICC. We believe that the Rome Statute is flawed and does not have sufficient protections from the possibility of politicised prosecutions. We reiterate our fundamental objection to the … Statute’s assertions that the ICC has jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States that have not become parties to the Rome Statute. 

US objection to the Rome Statute is therefore still impassioned. Furthermore, the US has gone further, within resolution 1593, to try and ensure the ICC’s conformity with US policy.​[26]​ First, the resolution makes express reference to Article 98(2) or bilateral agreements which have been independently signed by the US and a number of States in order to effectively limit the jurisdiction of the ICC over US citizens. Commenting on the inclusion of this provision within the Preamble the Brazilian representative went so far as to say that Brazil ‘has difficulty in supporting a reference that not only does not favour the fight against impunity but also stresses a provision whose application is a controversial issue’.​[27]​

Second, although the referral is from the SC as an organ of the United Nations, paragraph 7 emphasises that the United Nations shall not contribute to the costs of any ICC investigation.​[28]​ 

Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this article, paragraph 6 of the resolution purports to proscribe an element of the Court’s jurisdiction. The provision states, 

…that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State.

The pragmatic application of this provision is, in reality, inconsequential. The provision does not actually limit the jurisdiction of the Court beyond that which is already provided by the Statute. However, if seen as an attempt by the SC to make a referral to the ICC in which it seeks to authoritatively proscribe the jurisdiction of the Court, then difficulties arise as to the value of the paragraph. Before discussing the classification of this paragraph and its application by the ICC it is prudent to first outline the trigger mechanisms of the Rome Statute. 
 
Referrals & Deferrals under the Rome Statute.  

The ‘trigger’ mechanisms of the Rome Statute were among the most heavily debated provisions at the Rome Conference of 1998. Initial drafts of the Statute provided jurisdiction to the Court on two grounds. First, on referral by State Parties and second, by referral from the UNSC.​[29]​ At the Rome Conference the trigger mechanisms of the Statute were extended to include proprio motu powers vesting in the prosecutor.​[30]​ This power was hugely controversial and forms the mainstay of US objections to the Statute. 

In the 1994 Draft Statute specific provision was made for the UNSC to have an overt controlling interest in the prosecutorial function of the ICC. Draft Article 23 prescribed three fundamental tenets as to the interrelationship between the ICC and the Security Council. Paragraph (1) established the SC, acting under Chapter VII, as the only body in addition to states, able to trigger the investigatory mechanisms of the Court.​[31]​ In relation to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, paragraph 2 provided that the SC was first required to make a determination that an act of aggression had taken place. The final paragraph provided for the inverse of the finally agreed form of the ICC and SC relationship. Paragraph (3) stated that the ICC was prohibited from commencing a prosecution when the particular situation was before the SC pursuant to a threat or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression under Chapter VII. 

When commenting on the inclusion of paragraph (3) the Commission stated that it was ‘an acknowledgement of the priority given by Article 12 of the Charter, as well as for the need for co-ordination between the court and the Council in such cases’.​[32]​ Some members of the Commission stressed however, that the paragraph did not give the Council power of veto over the Court’s ability to commence prosecutions.​[33]​ However, it is clear, from a closer analysis that any such assertion is dubious. As with Article 16, Draft Article 23 qualified the Court’s ability to exercise its jurisdiction. Without the Council’s express consent, as provided for under the 1994 Draft Article, or without the implied consent as provided for under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court was actually, and is still potentially, limited in cases where the Council is involved under Chapter VII.​[34]​ Therefore I submit that what was suggested pursuant to the Draft Article and what was agreed under the current Article are both in the nature of a veto.​[35]​

The Draft Article was subsequently further refined, resulting in the presentation of a further draft statute for the Rome Conference of 1998. This later draft allowed for a number of combinations of options in which the Court’s jurisdiction could have been triggered. Firstly, under Article 6(1)(c) the 1998 Draft provided for proprio motu authority vesting in the Prosecutor. The necessity for a predetermination of aggression by the SC was retained under Draft Article 10(4).​[36]​ Likewise, the prohibition on the Court exercising its jurisdiction in matters where the SC was involved pursuant to Chapter VII was also retained under Draft Article 10(7). However, the substance of the finally agreed Article 16 appeared in option 2 of Draft Article 10(7).    

Article 16 of the Rome Statute details the principal characteristics of the agreed relationship. The Article provides that,  

	[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 	this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a 	resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 	has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 	Council under the same conditions. 

The Article is a stand-alone provision of the Rome Statute. It is not referred to by any other provision of the Statute, and no procedural provisions relating to it appear in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.​[37]​ 

The circumstances within which Article 16 could apply present a number of difficulties. There are four circumstances in which the article could be applied by the SC. First, it may be applied so as to avail the SC with an opportunity to declare the actions of the ICC itself, in commencing an investigation or prosecution, amount to a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39. Alternatively, a declaration may be forthcoming were the Council to believe that an investigation or prosecution that has already commenced will incite or lead to a ‘breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. Third, the Article may be applied in a pre-emptive manner after concluding that a particular situation, referred to the Court, is itself a threat under Article 39 which would not or could not be resolved or alleviated by the instigation of a criminal investigation. I submit that the fourth circumstance in which the UNSC may apply Article 16 is in the circumstance proscribed by Resolution 1593, that being a limited deferral relating to particular aspects of a situation. Therefore I contend that the most appropriate interpretation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1593, which seeks to limit the jurisdiction of the Court, is one in which it is seen as an Article 16 deferral and not as an attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the Court beyond that which is provided for in the Statute. Any such limitation that it purports to contain is therefore only binding upon the operation of the Court for a period of 12 months. For it to have a continuing affect on the Court a further resolution will be required. 

In providing for a referral by the UNSC Article 13(b) refers to the crimes set out under Article 5 of the Statute. Article 5 lists the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction. These are; the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.​[38]​ Definitions of these crimes appear under Articles 6, 7 and 8. The crime of aggression however is inoperative as no definition was agreed at the 1998 Rome Conference. Paragraph two of Article 5 states that the Court will exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a definition ‘setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise [its] jurisdiction’ has been agreed and adopted pursuant to Articles 121 and 123.​[39]​ By referring to the specific crimes defined in the Statute, the ICC Prosecutor is, himself, limited by the terms of Article 13(b). Although in relation to the inclusion of aggression within the Statute initial discussion centred upon the appropriateness of the Court acting outside of any UNSC determination that aggression had in fact occurred, the application of the concluded provisions of Articles 6, 7 & 8 are not contingent upon external determinations. Therefore it is the ambit of the jurisdiction as defined under the Rome Statute that dictates the limits of the authority of the Prosecutor and not the terms of a UNSC referral.  

The Court’s authority is clear even when faced with a UNSC referral that purports to limit its jurisdiction. In providing for UNSC referrals the Rome Statute does not expressly or implicitly raise the status of such referrals above that of the other trigger mechanisms. However, the nationality and territorial aspects of jurisdiction provided for within Article 12 only apply to State referrals or proprio motu investigations. While this is included to undoubtedly reflect the UNSC’s supremacy in the maintenance of international peace and security, it does not avail the Council of greater substantive authority within the Court. As a creature of Treaty and not an organ of the UN the ICC is independent. As emphasised in the UNSC referral of the situation in Darfur the ICC is not funded by the UN.​[40]​ Furthermore, unlike the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC is not a product of the UNSC. Therefore I submit that any UNSC referral that purports to provide the ICC with a basis of jurisdiction outside of that provided for in the Rome Statute should be seen as merely recommendatory.​[41]​ The implementation of such recommendations could come within the application of the Prosecutor’s inherently vague administrative discretion which arises in the day to day operation of an investigation. In the case of a proposed limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Court, the Prosecutor could, alternatively, view it as an Article 16 deferral, as is my submission in relation to paragraph 6 of resolution 1593. My ultimate contention is that the decision of whether to act upon a referral, recommendation or deferral lies with the Prosecutor in considering his jurisdiction under the Statute. This contention is supported by the remaining operational provisions of the Statute. The two most important provisions relating to the ambit of an Article 13 referral and any subsequent exercise of jurisdiction are Articles 17 and 53.​[42]​ 

Officially, the Prosecutor’s greatest level of discretion appears within Article 53. Within this Article the ‘interests of justice’ is referred to as a legitimate consideration when deciding whether to instigate an investigation or prosecution. Notwithstanding this formal element of discretion and the high level of interpretative freedom that vests with the Court, the Prosecutor has a significant level of informal discretion that will arise through the administrative operation of an investigation. Maintaining an element of co-operation with a home state, ensuring continued international support, fostering a co-operative relationship with the UNSC and protecting the Court from accusations of bias will all necessitate the application of sensitive discretion. Consequently, there may be informal opportunities for the Prosecutor to implement any problematic direction given to the Court by the UNSC. 

Before discussing the ambit of judicial review, it is prudent to briefly introduce the operative provision of UNSC resolution 1422 as a further example of a problematic SC direction. The resolution was passed in response to the renewal of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The US effectively held the UN to ransom over the renewal of such operations. Only by providing peacekeepers with an immunity against ICC prosecution would the US agree to continue their support. However in passing the resolution the UNSC made no reference to the UNMIBH. Resolution 1422 therefore appeared to provide a blanket deferral unrelated to a specific situation. In addition, the resolution was not based upon a prior Article 39 determination.​[43]​ The operative provision of the now defunct resolution 1422,

[r]equests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting from 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. 

As we shall see it is in the application of resolutions such as this that the argument for judicial review of the UNSC is at its most persuasive.  

The Court, Liberal Interpretation & Judicial Review. 

The remaining issue to be addressed in this article is the question of whether the Rome Statute allows for judicial review of UNSC referrals and/or deferrals. I argue that the Court ought to adopt a presumption of legality when reading UNSC resolutions. This presumption would ensure the application of a strong presumption in favour of the notion that the SC did not intend to substantively alter the jurisdiction of the Court beyond that which is provided for in the Statute. 

The two main areas in which the SC could be said to have acted ultra vires in relation to ICC referrals or deferrals are were there does not appear to have been an Article 39 determination and directions outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.  

Article 39 empowers the Council with its fundamental mandate. Appearing under Chapter VII ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’, Article 39 allows for the Council to determine the ‘existence of any threat to the peace’. In the absence of formal guidelines as to the application of this duty, it would appear that this portion of the Article allows for the positive identification of threats on a pre-emptory basis. The Article continues by providing that the Council is to determine any ‘breach of the peace’. This would appear to contrast with the first section of the Article by empowering the Council with a reactive determinative authority. The Article also expressly allows for the Council to determine acts of aggression. Following such a determination the Council is to make recommendations or merely take measures to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’.  

Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villalpando have suggested that in exercising their right of deferral under Article 16, the SC should only invoke the article after an express determination has been made under Article 39 of the Charter.​[44]​ However, these writers acknowledge that the SC, in finding a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 may rely upon the factual circumstances of the situation, or that the actions of the ICC itself may necessitate a determination under Article 39. Cassese however, has stated that the correct interpretation of Article 16 requires the SC to find that the actions of the ICC itself constitute a ‘threat to the peace’ for the purposes of Article 39​[45]​.  I contend that the wider, more inclusive acknowledgment of Condorelli and Villalpando is more pragmatically accurate. There is nothing stopping the SC acting in a pre-emptive way to defer the instigation of a particular investigation or prosecution. However, Condorelli and Villalpando continue by placing a caveat upon the possibility of pre-emptive determination by the SC. These writers speculate that a determination under Article 39 of the Charter ought not to be made in the,​[46]​
	
abstract … but shall be determined by the effect of the continuation of specific 	proceedings before the Court on the entire situation being dealt with by the 	Security Council. 

The writers continue by noting that Article 18 refers to ‘investigations’ and ‘prosecutions’ and not merely ‘proceedings’.​[47]​ I submit that they are undoubtedly correct in their observation; however this is, perhaps, not a view shared by the US administration.​[48]​ 

Notwithstanding these speculations, I submit that the arguments of Condorelli and Villalpando continue on a completely erroneous path. Upon noting that the deferral is binding upon the Court, Condorelli and Villalpando attempt to argue that the ICC ought to exercise a judicial review function over the SC. They state that,​[49]​ 

	[i]n exercising its power of judicial review of the resolution requesting the 	deferral, the Court will establish the legality or otherwise of the Security 	Council’s action. In so doing, the Court will also be entitled to ascertain that 	the Security Council has not exceeded its competence according to the 	Charter. 

They continue by stating that,​[50]​ 

	Although, … the Court appears to have no discretionary power in deciding 	whether to abide by the request of deferral, the decision by the Security 	Council is subject to such formal and substantial conditions as to require 	review by the jurisdictional organs, in the interests of justice and in order to 	safeguard the independence of the judiciary. 

In order to ensure that the interests of justice are safeguarded, these writers suggest​[51]​ that the Court test whether the SC has acted ultra vires not only in relation to the procedure in the making of the request, but also in relation to the requisite determination under Article 39 of the Charter.​[52]​ Furthermore, Condorelli and Villalpando, while acknowledging that the Court has no express authority to review, nonetheless believe that judicial review of the SC should be viewed as jurisdictional latto sensu.​[53]​ However if Condorelli and Villalpando’s line of reasoning were to be adopted then the Prosecutor, accused or suspect, the State which normally would exercise jurisdiction over the case, or a State to which acceptance of jurisdiction may be required,​[54]​ would all have the opportunity to ‘seize the competent jurisdictional body to obtain a verification of the legality of the Security Council’s resolution’.​[55]​ While I ultimately contend that to adopt this line of analysis is unsound, the reasoning of these commentators is not entirely unattractive, particularly when viewed in relation to resolution 1422.  

Cryer and White correctly observe that the operative provision of resolution 1422 cited above, lacks an express Article 39 pre-determination of a ‘threat to the peace’ and could be interpreted as applying to all situations and operations.​[56]​ However, this does not mean that an interpretation that conforms to the provisions of the Rome Statute is not possible. Therefore, while no express reference is made in the resolution to any particular UN operation the ICC Prosecutor is able to interpret the resolution as applying solely to UNMIBH operations. The same interpretative principle can be applied to the Resolution’s apparent lack of reference to an Article 39 determination. While this resolution does not apply to a ‘threat to the peace’ I submit that it is possible to interpret resolution 1422 as being coloured by the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SC’s prior determinations as to the status of the associated conflict. Applying such a clear interpretative presumption can avail the Court, as a judicial body operating under the Rule of Law, with the ability to operate harmoniously with the inherently political body that is the UNSC.

Notwithstanding the attractiveness of their argument as to the availability of judicial review, I nonetheless ultimately disagree with the contention of Condorelli and Villalpando on the basis of three grounds.  

First, to allow the ICC to operate a review jurisdiction over the actions of the SC would change the nature of the ICC and SC relationship. Such a move would in effect, turn the ICC into a constitutional court. Additionally, any determination by the ICC that the UNSC is subject to legally reviewable constraints would act to significantly disrupt the relationship between the UNSC and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ itself has only tentatively suggested that the SC is subject to legal constraints, but has failed to expressly acknowledge a right to constitutionally review SC decisions.  

Second, it is clear that the development of the ICC as a constitutional body was wholly unintended by the framers of the Statute. Both Condorelli and Villalpando acknowledge and then ignore the suggestion of Spain, prior to the adoption of the text of the Statute, for a SC request not to be automatically binding upon the Court.​[57]​ This clearly indicates that in adopting Article 16 such a suggestion was specifically rejected. The notion of an ICC review procedure is therefore completely inconsistent with Article 16 and the associated debate that surrounded the negotiation of the ICC and SC relationship.  

Third in focusing on deferrals under Article 16, Condorelli and Villalpando appear to make analogies with the ability of the SC to make referrals to the Court under Article 13(b). Two criticisms can be made of this analogy. First, what is involved under Article 13(b) is not in anyway a right of review. The assessment of a problematic SC referral by the ICC merely falls to the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction under the Statute. This does not, technically, involve a “review” of the referral itself but rather whether, subsequent to the referral, the jurisdictional requirements of the Court as a separate and autonomous creature of treaty have been fulfilled. 

In relation to the contention of Condorelli and Villalpando that the ICC is also able to review a referral made under Article 13(b), I likewise submit that this contention is not without its own difficulties. In developing their argument these writers rely heavily upon the ICTY case of the Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić.​[58]​ This case is referred to as authority for the proposition that the ICTY Appeals Chamber, as a separate organ to the SC, is able to review resolutions of the SC ‘in order to ascertain and be able to exercise its primary jurisdiction over the matter before it’.​[59]​ They then apply this proposition to the ICC in arguing that it has the authority to review SC referrals. Two points may be made here. First, I agree that in dealing with such a referral the ICC shall satisfy itself that the referral has been made in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter as provided for under Article 13(b), but only in a procedurally nominal way. In the case of an ambiguous resolution the ICC ought to apply a liberal interpretation to the resolution in light of the jurisdiction of the Court in order to appropriately classify the provision as either a referral or a deferral. Under such an approach even the blanket nature of paragraph 1 of resolution 1422 could have been specifically related to the particular situation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in order for it to fit within the provision of the Rome Statute.  

Second, I believe that Condorelli and Villalpando, in using the Tadić and ICC analogy, over emphasis the importance of the analogy. In no way is the determination of a situation as a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 relevant to the substantive jurisdiction of the ICC. Therefore, allowing the ICC to review such a determination under Article 39 will not help the ICC ‘ascertain … its primary jurisdiction’ or help in the Court ‘exercise its primary jurisdiction’ as was the situation in the Tadić case.  
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